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Abstract
This article examines the federal Wiretap Act and its
application to online communications in light of the United
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States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s recent decision
in United States v. Councilman. The federal Wiretap Act
places legal limits on the surveillance of electronic
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communications, but courts struggle to make sense of its
application to online communications. Formerly, courts held
that the Wiretap Act did not apply to the retrieval of
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communications from places of electronic storage. However,
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in United States v. Councilman, the First Circuit suggests
that retrieval of emails from temporary places of electronic
storage fall within the Wiretap Act. In order to avoid liability,
businesses that monitor customers online should seek
customer consent and familiarize themselves with different
interpretations of the federal statute as well as various state
wiretap statutes.
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INTRODUCTION
<1>

To what extent can businesses legally gather customer
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information through computer or online surveillance? Businesses
commonly place cookies 2 on customer computers, and some
businesses, such as Google with its Gmail service, scan emails
to learn customers’ buying habits, preferences and personal
information. The federal Wiretap Act regulates online and
computer surveillance; 3 however, the Act is “a complex, often
convoluted, area of the law,”4 and relatively few cases have
interpreted the Act’s application to online surveillance. Recently,
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit clarified
the application of the Act to email communications in United
States v. Councilman.5 Businesses should be aware of
Councilman’s implications when creating online monitoring
systems.

THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT
<2>

In 1968, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and

Safe Streets Act, the precursor to the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). 6 Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, known as the Wiretap Act,
addressed the interception of wire and oral communications.7
<3>

In 1986, Congress enacted the ECPA 8 in order to expand

the protections of the Wiretap Act. The stated purpose of the
ECPA is to “protect against the unauthorized interception of
electronic communications … [and] update and clarify Federal
privacy protections and standards in light of dramatic changes in
new computer and telecommunications technologies.” 9 The
ECPA broadens the scope of the earlier statute by including,
most notably, coverage of electronic communications.
<4>

The ECPA consists of two titles: the Wiretap Act and the

Stored Communications Act. Title I, the Wiretap Act, prohibits
anyone from “intentionally intercept[ing] or endeavor[ing] to
intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication.” 10 The
Wiretap Act exempts wire and electronic communication service
providers acting in their normal course of business. The Wiretap
Act also exempts situations where one party to the intercepted
communication grants consent. 11 Title II, the Stored
Communications Act, prohibits anyone from “intentionally
access[ing] without authorization a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided” and from
“intentionally exceed[ing] an authorization to access that
facility.” 12 The Stored Communications Act exempts providers of
electronic or wire communications services, regardless of
whether the provider acts in the normal course of business.13
<5>

Liability under the Wiretap Act (hereinafter “the Act”)
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requires three elements. First, the Act requires proof of specific
intent.14 Under this element, a party must intentionally or
recklessly disregard the law in order to be found liable. 15
<6>

Second, the Act requires presence of a “wire, oral, or

electronic communication.” 16 These elements are separately
defined by the Act. For example, “electronic communication” is
defined as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole
or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce.” Therefore, computer communications are electronic
communications under the Act. 17 In order to demonstrate the
presence of a wire, oral, or electronic communication, a party
bringing a suit under the Act must have entertained a
reasonable expectation of privacy.18 Where a party’s
conversation takes place using loud voices in a small room while
in the presence of other persons, and the conversation can be
heard with “[a] naked ear under uncontrived circumstances,”
there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy.19 In such a
case, the party’s suit would fail for lack of an oral
communication as defined by the Act.
<7>

The third element of liability under the Act is

“interception.” 20 Interception has proven to be the trickiest
aspect of the statute, and most debate surrounding the Wiretap
Act’s application to computer and internet surveillance examines
this fuzzy concept. The statute defines “intercept” as the “aural
or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or
oral communication through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device.” 21 The Act defines electronic,
mechanical, or other devices as “any device or apparatus which
can be used to intercept a wire, oral or electronic
communication” other than instruments furnished to the
subscriber of a communication service or being used by a
provider of a communication service in the ordinary course of its
business.22
<8>

Under the Act, interception refers to third-party acquisition

of communication contents but not transactional information.23
Transactional information consists of information related to user
transactions, such as dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling
information. Cookies normally register transactional data and do
not intercept content of communications; therefore, the Wiretap
Act generally does not cover cookies. In re DoubleClick Inc.
Privacy Litigation exemplifies this distinction.24 In DoubleClick, a
corporate provider of internet advertising products and services

http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol2/a018Belskis.html[3/23/2010 8:55:49 AM]

Applying the Wiretap Act to Online Communications after United States v. Councilman >> Shidler Journal of Law, Commerce & Technology

used cookies to collect information about Internet users in order
to target online advertising. Plaintiffs argued that the cookies
were “wiretaps” intercepting their communications. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held,
however, that there was no violation of the Wiretap Act.
Although the court based its decision on a consent theory,
commentators generally refer to this case to articulate the
content-transactional distinction.25 The section below further
explores the concept of interception.
<9>

The Wiretap Act contains two major exceptions. First, no

violation takes place when a communication service provider,
whose facilities are used in the transmission of the
communication, intercepts a communication in the normal
course of business or when the interception is necessary to
protect the property or rights of the provider.26 Second, the
statute makes interception permissible where at least one party
to the communication gives prior consent. 27

UNITED STATES V. COUNCILMAN AND THE MEANING OF
“INTERCEPTION”
<10>

Circuit Courts of Appeal that have considered the matter

have traditionally held that “‘intercept’ under the ECPA must
occur contemporaneously with transmission.”28 According to
this theory, the Wiretap Act does not cover communications
sitting in any type of electronic storage, because interception
does not occur instantaneously with transmission. Therefore,
where a communication is sent but remains unopened in the
recipient’s computer, third-party acquisition of this stored
communication does not violate the Wiretap Act. For example,
where the Secret Service seized a computer used to operate an
electronic bulletin board system containing private electronic
mail messages which had not yet been retrieved by their
intended recipients, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held there
was no violation of the Wiretap Act because the definition of
“electronic communication” does not include electronic storage of
such communications.29
<11>

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly held that a

lawyer who used a patently unlawful subpoena to gain access to
email stored by an Internet service provider did not violate the
Wiretap Act because the “Act only applies to the acquisition
contemporaneous with transmission,” and “Congress did not
intend for ‘intercept’ to apply to ‘electronic communications’
when those electronic communications are in electronic
storage.”30 In Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that when the vice president of Hawaiian
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Airlines accessed the plaintiff pilot’s website without permission,
there was no violation of the Wiretap Act. The Court found that
“[f]or a website such as Konop’s to be ‘intercepted’ in violation
of the Wiretap Act, it must be acquired during transmission, not
while it is in electronic storage.”31 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that when an individual used a Trojan Horse virus
to hack into another’s computer and download files stored on
the computer’s hard drive, there was no violation of the Act32
because “a contemporaneous interception—i.e., an acquisition
during ‘flight’—is required to implicate the Wiretap Act with
respect to electronic communications.”33
<12>

What happens when the interception of a communication

occurs both: (1) contemporaneously with transmission; and (2)
while the communication sits in a location of electronic storage?
“Traveling the internet, electronic communications are often—
perhaps constantly—both ‘in transit’ and ‘in storage’
simultaneously, a linguistic but not a technological paradox.”34
United States v. Councilman posed this vexing issue to the First
Circuit Court of Appeals.35 The First Circuit initially ruled that
such an acquisition does not violate the Wiretap Act
(Councilman I).36 However, the court reversed following an en
banc rehearing, holding that such acquisition does constitute an
interception and, therefore, violates the Wiretap Act (Councilman
II).37
<13>

In Councilman, defendant Bradford C. Councilman was the

vice-president of an online rare and out-of-print book listing
service called Interloc. In addition to the book listing service,
Interloc provided customers with email accounts and acted as a
service provider for these accounts. In order to better target
customers and respond to growing competition from
Amazon.com, Interloc intercepted and copied email
communications sent from Amazon.com to its customers before
delivering the messages into customer email accounts. Plaintiffs
charged that Councilman violated the Wiretap Act by
intercepting these email communications. The Stored
Communications Act was inapplicable in this case due to a
statutory exception that exempts communication service
providers.38
<14>

The process of email transmission technically enables an

email message to sit in electronic storage during the process of
transmission. Email operates by splitting a message into small
packets and then transferring these packets from computer to
computer until the packets reach their final destination, where
they are reconfigured.39 As packets travel from computer to
computer, they are stored in intermediary locations called
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Message Transfer Agents (MTA). 40 Each MTA stores the
message locally before routing it through to another MTA until
the message ultimately reaches the recipient’s mail server.
Email service providers often use separate Mail Delivery Agents
(MDA) to retrieve messages from the MTA and deliver them to
recipients. Interloc used a program called procmail as its MDA.
Interloc rewrote the procmail program code so that it
intercepted, copied, and stored all incoming emails from
Amazon.com before delivering them into recipients’ email
boxes.41 The procmail program operated while messages were
stored in the random access memory (RAM) or hard disks within
the Interloc system. Therefore, Interloc intercepted the
customer emails from temporary storage within Interloc’s own
computer system. Councilman argued that because the
communications were copied from electronic storage and
because the term “electronic communication” does not include
“electronic storage,” there was no interception as contemplated
by the Wiretap Act. 42
<15>

In Councilman I, the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled

that Councilman did not violate the Wiretap Act because the
email communications at issue were intercepted while in
electronic storage. The Wiretap Act defines “wire communication”
to include “any electronic storage” of wire communications 43
and defines “electronic storage” as “any temporary, intermediate
storage.”44 On the other hand, the Wiretap Act’s definition of
“electronic communication” contains no mention of electronic
storage. The First Circuit found that the inclusion of electronic
storage within the statutory definition of wire communication,
and the exclusion of electronic storage from the definition of
electronic communication, suggests that “Congress did not
intend for the Wiretap Act’s interception provisions to apply to
communication in electronic storage.”45
<16>

The Councilman I court acknowledged the problem of

contemporaneity and conceded that Interloc intercepted emails
contemporaneously as they were being transmitted.

46

However, the court explained that the contemporaneity rule was
trumped because of: (1) the exclusion of “electronic storage”
from the definition of “electronic communication”; (2) “the
presence of the words ‘any temporary intermediate storage’”
within the definition of “electronic storage”; and (3) the fact
that “the electronic communications in this case were in a form
of electronic storage.”47 Because procmail performed its
operations while the communications were stored in RAM or
hard disks within Interloc’s computer system, the
communications were outside the scope of “electronic
48
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communication.”
<17>

The Councilman I court explained that Congress’s omission

of “electronic storage” from the definition of “electronic
communication” indicated that Congress meant to provide lesser
protection to electronic communications than to wire and oral
communications. Even if the omission was accidental, “it is not
the province of this court to graft meaning onto the statute
where Congress has spoken plainly.” 49
<18>

In October 2004, a majority of the First Circuit agreed to

rehear Councilman en banc,50 whereupon the court withdrew
and vacated the prior judgment. In Councilman II, the First
Circuit ruled that the “electronic communication” includes
“transient electronic storage that is intrinsic to the
communication process.” Therefore, the court ruled that
interception of an email communication in transient electronic
storage violates the Wiretap Act. 51
<19>

In Councilman II, the court conceded that a plain meaning

interpretation of the Wiretap Act suggests that “electronic
communication” does not include transient electronic storage.
The court explained the Russello maxim as holding that “where
Congress includes particular language in one section of the
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” 52 However,
the court noted that the Russello maxim holds true only where
Congress acted deliberately and carefully in choosing its words
of construction and where the provisions’ language, structure
and circumstances of enactment are analogous. 53 The
definitions of “electronic communication” and “wire
communication” were constructed at different times and under
different circumstances, and contain language that is not
parallel. Accordingly, it cannot be inferred that Congress
intended to exclude transient stored communications from the
definition of “electronic communications.”54
<20>

In order to ascertain the true meaning of “electronic

communications,” the court looked to legislative intent. House
reports and hearings indicated that Congress intended to protect
“pre- and post-transmission ‘temporary, intermediate storage of
a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic
transmission.”55 According to the court, although the statute
defines “electronic storage” broadly to include any temporary or
intermediate storage, the purpose of this broad definition is to
heighten privacy protection for stored data and not to exclude
email messages stored during transmission.56 In addition, by
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including “electronic storage” in the definition of “wire
communication,” Congress intended to ensure the protection of
voice mail and did not intend to affect the protection of
email. 57
<21>

Although the Councilman facts involved interception of

email communications contemporaneous with transmission, the
First Circuit did not base its decision on the rule of
contemporaneity. In dicta, the Councilman II court states that it
did not address the issue of “whether the term ‘intercept’
applies only to acquisitions that occur contemporaneously with
the transmission of a message from sender to recipient, or,
instead, extends to an event that occurs after a message has
crossed the finish line of transmission.”58 The opinion says that
the traditional rule requiring a real-time interception may not be
apt for questions involving the application of the Wiretap Act to
electronic communications. In doing so, the First Circuit leaves
open the possibility of a more expansive application of the
Wiretap Act to post-transmission email communications that
have arrived at the destination computer, but sit in storage at
the destination unopened.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ONLINE BUSINESSES
<22>

Violators of the Wiretap Act can be fined or imprisoned for

up to five years. 59 Although only time will tell whether other
federal circuits will follow the Councilman II holding, online
businesses should avoid unreasonable risk. Businesses should
presume that Councilman II’s stricter rendition of the statute is
correct, and they should comply accordingly. Under Councilman
II, scanning customer emails or placing cookies on customer
computers in order to surreptitiously intercept content of
communications could result in liability under the Wiretap Act,
even if the intercepted data technically sits in “electronic
storage” during transmission. Businesses wishing to use these
methods to collect customer information should first seek clear
consent from customers.
<22>

The Wiretap Act’s consent exception allows interception of

an electronic communication “where such person is a party to
the communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception.” 60
Consent can be express or implied, and courts generally look at
the overall circumstances when making a determination. 61 In
order to be safe, businesses should seek express written
consent.
<23>

Consent agreements should be broadly written to include
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all types of information businesses might collect. After acquiring
consent, businesses should stay well within the bounds of their
agreement. When a data collection business serving online
pharmaceutical companies used cookies to collect customer
names, addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, dates
of birth, genders, insurance statuses, education levels,
occupations, medical conditions, and medications, the First
Circuit held that the data collection business exceeded its
consent by collecting such personally identifiable information.
The court determined that the customer pharmaceutical
companies agreed only to the interception of a subset of these
communications.62 In addition, businesses should enable
customers to take simple steps to avoid collection of their
personal information. Where an online advertising company used
cookies to collect personal user information and create detailed
user profiles, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York determined that the company did not
violate the Wiretap Act because it only collected transactional
data and enabled users to prevent data collection by visiting a
special website and requesting an “opt-out” cookie. 63

STATE WIRETAP STATUTES
<24>

Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have their

own state wiretap statutes. 64 Because states largely modeled
their statues after the federal act, 65 and because states cannot
“impose requirements less stringent” than the federal
standard, 66 state courts often read their wiretap statutes as
being consistent with interpretations of the federal act. States
may set forth standards stricter than the federal statute.67
Currently, twelve states have two-party consent requirements,
meaning that both parties to the communication must give
consent in order to make interception of a communication
permissible. These states are California, 68 Connecticut, 69
Delaware,70 Florida,

71

Illinois, 72 Maryland, 73

Massachusetts,74 Michigan,75 Montana,76 New Hampshire,77
Pennsylvania,78 and Washington. 79
<25>

Many online businesses appear not to comply with these

two-party consent statutes. DoubleClick, for example, has
permission from commercial websites to intercept their web
communications with their users. However, individual users
generally do not consent to the interception of personal
information. Google might also be liable under state wiretap
statutes for the way it administers its Gmail product. 80 Gmail is
an email service provider that provides target advertising to
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customers. Advertisers buy keywords from Gmail, and Gmail
scans the contents of incoming emails in order to determine
which relevant advertisement to display when the recipient
opens his or her email. Although Gmail subscribers give consent
by signing waivers, individuals who exchange emails with Gmail
users do not consent to the interception and scanning of their
communications.
<26>

Given this appearance of noncompliance, it is somewhat

surprising that online businesses have not been summoned to
state court for violating two-party consent statutes. Perhaps the
traditional rule that a communication must be “contemporaneous
with transmission” in order to fall within the Wiretap Statute has
deterred nonconsenting parties from filing suit, because this
interpretation generally exonerates businesses from liability.
Councilman II offers a different interpretation so that
communications in “electronic storage,” which are not
necessarily “contemporaneous with transmission,” might fall
under the purview of the Act. Online businesses should act
cautiously and obtain consent from all parties to the
communication whenever possible.

CONCLUSION
<27>

Before implementing customer monitoring or surveillance

devices, online businesses should familiarize themselves with
both federal and state wiretap statutes. The federal Wiretap Act
places legal limits on online and computer surveillance, but
courts disagree over application of the Act, making it difficult for
online businesses to draw a clear set of guidelines. The First
Circuit recently interpreted the Wiretap Act and its application to
email in United States v. Councilman.81 Whether other circuits
will follow the Councilman II interpretation remains unknown;
therefore, practitioners and businesses should stay abreast of
developments in their jurisdictions.

PRACTICE POINTERS
Don’t intercept content without clear consent. If you
wish to intercept the content of a communication,
you should first seek express written consent,
preferably from both parties to the communication.
Transactional information can be intercepted without
consent, but be careful that your transactional
interception does not bleed into content interception.
Write consent agreements broadly to include all
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types of information that might be collected. After
acquiring consent, you should stay within the bounds
of the agreement.
Consider allowing customers to take simple steps to
opt out of collection of personal information.
Stay tuned for further developments, because other
federal Circuit Courts of Appeal may be called upon
to adopt or reject the First Circuit’s statutory
interpretation in Councilman II.
<< Top
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